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FY 14-15: Agency Priority Goal
Continue to make progress toward securing the most vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide.
Priority Goal
Goal Overview
In his April 2009 Prague speech, President Obama stated that “we must ensure that terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon. This is the most immediate and extreme threat to global security. One terrorist with one nuclear weapon could unleash massive destruction. Al Qaeda has said it seeks a bomb and that it would have no problem with using it. And we know that there is unsecured nuclear material across the globe. To protect our people, we must act with a sense of purpose without delay. So today I am announcing a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years. We will set new standards, expand our cooperation with Russia, pursue new partnerships to lock down these sensitive materials.” The Joint Statement from the Moscow Summit between Presidents Obama and Medvedev in July 2009, the September 2009 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1887, and the Nuclear Security Summits in April 2010 and March 2012, reinforce that this is a pressing global security issue.
Key Challenges include:
• Host country’s commitment to implement and sustain their nuclear security/removal activities.
• Additional agreements need to be negotiated with foreign governments before all work can be completed as planned.
Stakeholder Engagement: The Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) works with other U.S. government agencies, multilateral institutions, foreign governments, and commercial contractors. Policy issues are coordinated with the National Security Council and the Department of State. NNSA nonproliferation programs maintain close coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Department of Defense's Cooperative Threat Reduction Agency.
This priority goal supports the nuclear security strategic goal and the strategic objective to reduce goal nuclear security threats.
Strategies
To implement the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) material removal portion of the goal, NNSA has: assessed the worldwide inventory of nuclear materials; coordinated with other USG agencies and countries; and developed a prioritized list of the most vulnerable materials to be removed/eliminated.
Progress Update
In response to the threat of international terrorists acquiring material to develop weapons of mass destruction, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)’s Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) program has worked closely with a wide range of international partners, U.S. federal agencies, Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratories, and the private sector to detect, secure, and dispose of dangerous nuclear and radiological material. DNN’s primary mission of thwarting the ability for terrorists, or rogue states that harbor terrorist organizations, to acquire nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials directly supports the Department’s Priority Goal to continue to make progress to secure the most vulnerable nuclear material worldwide.
DOE/NNSA surpassed its cumulative target of removing or disposing 5,332 kg of vulnerable nuclear material (HEU and plutonium) by the end of FY 2015 by removing or disposing a cumulative total of 5,376 kg. Through the end of the second quarter, two successful removals were completed (40 kg total); in the third quarter, GTRI was able to successfully confirm the disposition (via downblending) of HEU in France (112 kg); and in the fourth quarter, 17 kg were successfully removed for a total of 169 kg of weapons-usable material removed or disposed of around the world in FY 2015.
Q4 Joint Coordinating Committee Meeting
- Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program discusses plans for the upcoming fresh and spent fuel shipments in a number of countries.
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Q4 – Completed: The Nuclear Removal Program participated in the 11th Joint Coordinating Committee Meeting on the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program and discussed plans for the upcoming fresh and spent fuel shipments in a number of countries.
This APG is being replaced with a new APG for FY16-17. The new APG and milestones will be published when final approval is granted.
Next Steps
No Data Available
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Performance Indicators
Cumulative number of kilograms of vulnerable nuclear material (highly enriched uranium and plutonium) removed or disposed.
Contributing Programs & Other Factors
Global Threat Reduction Initiative
The mission of GTRI is to reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological material located at civilian sites worldwide. GTRI supports the U.S. Department of Energy's Nuclear Security Goal of preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear and radiological materials that could be used in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or other acts of terrorism by: (1) converting research reactors and isotope production facilities from the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU); (2) removing and disposing of excess nuclear and radiological materials; and (3) protecting high-priority nuclear and radiological materials from theft.
Strategic Objectives
Strategic Objective:
Statement:
Reduce global nuclear security threats
Description:
Preventing nuclear terrorism and the spread of nuclear weapons-related materials, technology, and expertise is a key U.S. national security strategic objective defined in Presidential statements and national security strategy and policy documents. The Department pursues this objective by: providing policy and technical leadership to remove and eliminate, or secure and safeguard the most vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide; limiting or preventing the transfer and trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, WMD-related materials, technology, and expertise; advancing national and international technical capabilities to understand and detect foreign nuclear weapons production and detonation; and developing a comprehensive science-based predictive model for a broad range of nuclear threat devices. DOE also works to strengthen regulatory, safety, security and safeguards infrastructure in countries new to nuclear power; provide and maintain a technically trained-and-ready response to radiological or nuclear incidents worldwide; and provide technical and analytical support, and capability development, for meeting and monitoring compliance with nuclear nonproliferation, counter-proliferation, nuclear forensics, and arms control treaties.
In pursuing this objective, NNSA works in partnership with the Departments of State, Defense, Homeland Security, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Intelligence Community, and other U.S. agencies. Internationally, DOE has a strong and long-established partnership with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and actively conducts bilateral program coordination, as well as multilateral consultations through fora such as the Nuclear Security Summit, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. These exchanges, as well as a variety of domestic and international workshops, tabletop and national-level full-field exercises, provide a real-time capability to reduce nuclear security threats, and validate improvements to that capability. DOE also uses the knowledge gained from these information exchanges to inform its regular program strategy evaluations and assessments. For example, the Second Line of Defense program strategic review resulted in adjustments of program scope and priorities and the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Reconciliation report identified additional nuclear materials for potential removal or elimination.
Agency Priority Goals
Statement: In support of this goal, DOE will: Remove or confirm disposition of an additional 315 kilograms of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for a cumulative total of 5,332 kilograms by the end of FY 2015.
Description: In his April 2009 Prague speech, President Obama stated that “we must ensure that terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon. This is the most immediate and extreme threat to global security. One terrorist with one nuclear weapon could unleash massive destruction. Al Qaeda has said it seeks a bomb and that it would have no problem with using it. And we know that there is unsecured nuclear material across the globe. To protect our people, we must act with a sense of purpose without delay. So today I am announcing a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years. We will set new standards, expand our cooperation with Russia, pursue new partnerships to lock down these sensitive materials.” The Joint Statement from the Moscow Summit between Presidents Obama and Medvedev in July 2009, the September 2009 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1887, and the Nuclear Security Summits in April 2010 and March 2012, reinforce that this is a pressing global security issue. Key Challenges include: • Host country’s commitment to implement and sustain their nuclear security/removal activities. • Additional agreements need to be negotiated with foreign governments before all work can be completed as planned. Stakeholder Engagement: The Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) works with other U.S. government agencies, multilateral institutions, foreign governments, and commercial contractors. Policy issues are coordinated with the National Security Council and the Department of State. NNSA nonproliferation programs maintain close coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Department of Defense's Cooperative Threat Reduction Agency. This priority goal supports the nuclear security strategic goal and the strategic objective to reduce goal nuclear security threats.